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ABSTRACT
GPS, Galileo and GLONASS are preparing for the transmis-
sion of signals in two protected frequency bands (L1, and L5).
The combined use of such signals and the verification of their
consistency significantly improve the autonomous integrity
of position estimates. Aviation applications benefit from this
increase in performance, and the use of GNSS as primary
means of navigation for precision approach, e.g. in the LPV-
200 category, comes into reach.
Previously considered integrity architectures heavily depend
on augmentation, and have to respond within the time-to-
alert. Autonomous methods, such as the Advanced Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) considered here,
do not suffer from the latter constraint. However the threat
space is significantly inflated: Simultaneous satellite faults
as well as constellation faults need to be considered. This
can be addressed by an ARAIM algorithm employing the
principle of Multiple Hypothesis Solution Separation (MHSS),
and limiting the threat space to faults with large probability.
The present paper assesses the performance of this algo-
rithm using combinations of future GNSS under different
assumptions of satellite fault probability and constellation fault
probability. Combinations of GPS, Galileo and GLONASS are
investigated to determine the worldwide availability coverage
using the integrity requirements defined in LPV-200: Verti-
cal Protection Level (VPL), Effective Monitoring Threshold
(EMT) and vertical positioning accuracy (Accv).
Based on the simulation results presented here, combina-
tions of GPS and Galileo are shown to provide sufficient
VPL-based performance for LPV-200 precision approaches
at all runways worldwide. However there exist limitations
on meeting the EMT requirement if a single satellite is
unavailable. Minimal dependence on the probability of satellite
fault is observed for both VPL and EMT. With fault proba-
bilities higher than 10−3/approach, the LPV-200 availability
requirement is not met. This probability threshold corresponds
to approximately 40 observed faults per year for a nominal 27-
SV constellation, with a 6-hour latency after fault onset.
When using a triple GPS-Galileo-GLONASS constellation,
the simulated performance becomes generally robust enough
to handle even worst case scenarios without any degradation
of the relevant performance metrics. However it is shown that
assuming independent satellite fault events at high probabil-
ities leads to high computational complexity with potential
implications for the real-time capability of ARAIM. Thus, the
current research results recommend a limitation on the total
number of satellites used for processing integrity limits with
MHSS ARAIM, possibly by employing a selection process to
visible satellites from all available constellations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, airborne navigation already strongly relies on Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). As a primary means
of navigation in a precision approach, classical Receiver Au-
tonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) approaches such as [1]
have not been possible to use due to the stringent requirements
on the 10−7/approach integrity risk error bound associated
with the vertical positioning error (VPE). Particularly, in
order to emulate the performance of existing SBAS, RAIM
algorithms would have to provide LPV-200 availability, for
which the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) is 35 m.
While RAIM algorithms that are currently in use for hori-
zontal navigation (RNAV) cannot be employed with applica-
tions requiring vertical guidance, Advanced RAIM algorithms
developed from the Multi-Hypothesis Solution Separation
(MHSS) algorithm [2] can provide the necessary robust-
ness to support LPV-200 based approaches. Advanced RAIM
(ARAIM) is a new category of satellite navigation integrity
algorithms that has been emerging over the past 5 years,
along with the prospect of having multiple simultaneously
operational GNSS constellations, each with enhanced multi-
frequency navigation signals. The novelty that these algorithms
bring over the classical RAIM algorithms, developed over the
previous two decades, is that they are designed to handle any
number of simultaneous satellite faults, which are inherent in
a combined constellation scenario, as well as entire constel-
lation faults. Additionally, ARAIM algorithms expect to take
advantage of the anticipated multi-frequency signals in order
to eliminate the unpredictable ionospheric delay, one of the
most significant error sources for the earlier systems based
on single-frequency GPS. With the possibility to use dual-
frequency measurements on L1 and L5 and thus allowing users
themselves to correct for the ionospheric delay [3], the residual
nominal measurement errors will be low enough to allow for
guidance of an approaching plane down to a decision height
of 200 ft above the runway threshold.
Of the emerging category of ARAIM algorithms, the MHSS
algorithm was the first one to be developed and it is the
most widely known today in the satellite navigation and
civil aviation communities. This ARAIM algorithm, originally
developed at Stanford University [4], [5], has several variants
today, as it is being further developed and validated by multiple
research groups across the world. The results presented in
this paper are based on an MHSS algorithm implemented
at DLR and described in Section III. Previous studies have
shown that a constellation of 30 modernized GPS satellites
in geometry optimized orbits in combination with MHSS
ARAIM onboard the aircraft can provide worldwide coverage
at LPV-200 required integrity levels [6].
With Galileo becoming operational and GLONASS being
modernized, users will be able to benefit from dual-frequency
measurements originating from at least three different con-
stellations. Given the larger number of ranging sources, it
becomes necessary that the integrity concept providing robust
navigation from the corresponding measurements has to con-
sider multiple simultaneous satellite faults even at a relatively
low probability of independent space vehicle (SV) faults (e.g.
about 1 SV anomaly per year, causing errors in excess of the
nominal model).
The grade of performance that can be obtained with an
MHSS based RAIM algorithm depends on both assumptions
of the magnitude of nominal measurement errors and on the
probability that non-nominal measurement errors occur. An
initial investigation of the dependence of VPL and availability
on the signal-in-space (SIS) accuracy and biases affecting
nominal measurement has been conducted in [7]. The fault
probability dependence implies that with less confident ground
monitoring, the performance of navigation integrity degrades
for users of ARAIM.
When new GNSS constellations or modernized SV payloads
based on novel hardware architectures such as precise on-
board clocks are considered, ground monitoring cannot in-
stantly guarantee a low probability of satellite fault (Psat) due
to limitations on the amount of already collected data. It can
be assumed that with more observation data being collected
from ground monitoring, the confidence in an estimate on the
average satellite fault rate (i.e. the mean time between faults, or
annual fault frequency of a constellation or a set of satellites
based on the same hardware) increases. ARAIM users can
then rely on lower fault probabilities, ultimately leading to
less likely fault hypotheses, and better integrity performance.
This paper examines the dependence of ARAIM perfor-
mance on different sets of prior probabilities, both related to
individual satellite faults (Psat) and to faults in one whole
constellation (Pconst). Service volume simulations give an
estimation of the percentage of users that will be able to ob-
tain LPV-200 compliant integrity performance under different
assumptions on fault probabilities. Apart from the Vertical Pro-
tection Level (VPL), other requirements in the framework of
LPV-200 include the Effective Monitoring Threshold (EMT)
and the vertical accuracy (Accv). It has been observed that,
depending on the assumed fault probability Psat, the EMT may
become a limiting factor for availability coverage instead of
the VPL.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces the threat model used to describe the fault
characteristics that ARAIM needs to mitigate. These charac-
teristics include the statistical modeling of “nominal” ranging
measurements and probabilistic modeling of the fault states for
both individual satellites and complete GNSS constellations.
Section III describes how MHSS RAIM is able to offer protec-
tion against threats contained in the previously described threat
model. In Section IV, the simulation scenarios and parameters
used to assess ARAIM performance are introduced, and the
requirements that are defined by the LPV-200 performance
framework are itemized as metrics that can be obtained from
the simulation data. The Sections IV-B and V present the
simulation results with respect to individual scenarios and as a
comparison based on the variable parameter Psat, followed by
a succinct set of closing remarks summarizing the conclusions
of the current study and proposed directions for future work.
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II. THREAT MODEL
This paper employs the same threat model and residual
range error modeling described in [4], [5] for our implemen-
tation of the MHSS algorithm. In the current section, only a
brief review of this threat model is offered.
ARAIM relies strongly on assumptions about both the
probability of a fault onset, and on the maximum magnitude of
measurement errors that may remain undetected. It is required
that ground monitoring continuously observes the satellite
measurements and alerts users if the measurement error mag-
nitude for any user is likely to exceed the broadcast error
overbound. The proposed Integrity Support Message (ISM)
would contain fault probabilities and parameters characterizing
the measurement error distribution that need to be provided to
the user with a maximum delay of TTAext [8].
A. Fault Probabilities
The definition of a fault is characterized by a combination
of a Gaussian overbound, URA, and a maximum bias, bmax.
These two parameters describe a probability distribution for
the ranging error of every satellite which is not to be exceeded
by the actual distribution of error measurements. It is the
responsibility of ground monitoring to determine URA and
bmax such as to guarantee that the probability distribution of
ranging measurement errors for all users in the service volume
is below this estimate.
When ground monitoring guarantees such a level of perfor-
mance and integrity of the observed satellites, a remaining
risk exists for the user that a satellite fault may become
effective during approach and ground monitoring will not
be able to alert the user within the external time-to-alert
(TTAext). Failure in alerting the user may either result from
not detecting the fault on ground, or from not forwarding
the alert event fast enough. It is important to emphasize the
difference between the external time-to-alert, which describes
the maximum timespan between a fault being detected by
ground monitoring and the user being alerted, and global
time-to-alert (TTA) as a requirement from LPV-200. While
the TTA is required not to exceed 6 seconds, TTAext may
be significantly larger. However, a large TTAext value implies
that the probability of fault onset refers to a larger time span
as well. The same ground monitoring system can thus only
guarantee a larger value of Psat as TTAext increases.
A second probability input to ARAIM addresses the likeli-
hood of a constellation fault onset during the same timespan,
denoted as Pconst. The term “constellation fault” refers to those
hypotheses containing multiple correlated satellite faults. An
example of such a fault is a situation where due to erroneous
navigation data, a single constellation position solution is
consistent enough as to pass through classical RAIM FDE
tests but results in a high position error for the user. This very
specific situation may occur if all satellite positions are jointly
rotated or shifted into the same direction with respect to what
is broadcast as navigation data. Although it is very unlikely
that this may occur due to individual fault events for every
satellite, it is possible that the navigation data gets corrupted
while being processed prior to uploading it to the SVs. Again,
constellation faults can be detected by ground monitoring, but
the user algorithm has to consider the remaining probability
of experiencing this fault mode without being notified in time.
B. Nominal Error Model
A second characterization of the range measurement errors,
URE and bnom, is used to estimate the predicted behavior of the
ARAIM algorithm without the necessity to have real measure-
ments available. The previously introduced characterization of
error, through URA and bmax, defines a probability distribution
that overbounds the real measurement error distribution at its
tails. This overbound is a conservative estimation of the real
errors and can therefore be considered assessing the integrity
of the system. The vertical difference between the full-set
solution and a subset solution is called the solution separation.
As the ARAIM VPL needs to be predicted in simulation, the
behavior of the solution separation will be probabilistically
estimated such that the continuity requirement is guaranteed
to be met, and for every fault mode considered in the fault
tree of computed hypotheses. The probability that any of the
solution separations is under-estimated is therefore limited by
the continuity risk, which is defined at Pcont = 4 × 10−6 for
LPV-200 operations. Note that this requirement conservatively
refers to a single epoch in this work, following a suggestion
from [8].
Concluding the definition of the threat space, ARAIM as-
sumes that the position error of a measurement is overbounded
by a probability distribution defined by URA and bmax with
a probability of 1 − Psat. Using this dependence, the next
section will explain how the ARAIM algorithm determines
combinations of satellite faults based on their prior likelihood,
and how it computes the prediction of VPL used as the main
metric in the availability study.
III. INTEGRITY DETERMINATION WITH MHSS
The VPL is a limit on the VPE for the user and, together
with its horizontal correspondent HPL and other requirements,
is used to assess whether using the position solution for
navigation is safe for a specific operation, e.g. precision
landing. VPL is connected with the integrity risk PHMI in a
way that assures that the actual VPE can exceed the VPL
with at most this probability. ARAIM splits the risk of excess
positioning error among individual hypotheses, which are mu-
tually exclusive and commonly exhaustive. Every hypothesis
refers to a unique combination of faulted and nominal satellite
measurements.
MHSS will allocate the available integrity risk to a set
of mutually exclusive fault hypotheses using the approach
originally developed in [2], with optimization strategies and
algorithmic extensions introduced in [4] and [5]. Sections III-
A and III-B provide a short review of the underlying algorithm
that was used to produce the presented simulation results.
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A. MHSS Fault Hypotheses
The guaranteed probability of fault for an individual satellite
can be used to compute the probability of a unique combina-
tion of faults, using
Pj = Psat
k (1− Psat)(n−k) , (1)
where the total number of measurements in the hypothesis
(j) is n and the total number of faulted satellites is k.
This assumption is valid if the fault events addressed by
this estimation are independent. One important fault type
which is neglected by this approach is the constellation fault.
These hypotheses are therefore considered additionally with a
separate probability.
Assuming no fault modes other than independent faults of
satellites with the probability Psat, the total probability over
all fault combination adds to one:
∑
all j
Pj = 1 (2)
The state of each satellite is modeled as either “faulty” or
“nominal”, thus the resulting total number of hypotheses is:
J = 2n . (3)
Naturally, with a low probability of single satellite fault,
a combination of multiple satellites becomes more unlikely
to occur. A large part of the higher order fault modes can
therefore be accommodated in a small partition within the
integrity budget, denoted Punknown. With their total probability
being only a fraction of PHMI, these fault modes are considered
unlikely to threaten the user position integrity, so no hypoth-
esis VPL is computed. These higher order fault hypotheses
are called the unknown hypotheses. All remaining estimated
hypotheses, denoted computed hypotheses, will be considered
determining the VPL in a later step. The remaining integrity
budget is distributed in an optimal way between all computed
hypotheses, and the resulting hypothesis VPLs are directly
connected with the probability allocated to every hypothesis:
PHMI − Punknown =
∑
all computed j
Pj · P{HMI|Hj} (4)
From the shown relationship between satellite fault proba-
bility and available integrity budget it becomes apparent that
the number of computed hypotheses for a standard PHMI of
10−7 becomes larger if the fault probability is high, including
fault modes of more simultaneous faults. Table I shows the
number of computed hypotheses for a 18 SV geometry and
a 25 SV geometry along with the maximum number of
simultaneous faults, dmax, for different values of Psat. Here,
the fault probability Psat is connected with the satellite fault
rate through the external alert time, TTAext.
TABLE I
SATELLITE FAULT PROBABILITY PSAT , NUMBER OF COMPUTED
HYPOTHESES PER EPOCH, AND NUMBER OF MAXIMUM SIMULTANEOUS
SATELLITE FAULTS
Psat J (n=18) dmax (n=18) J (n=25) dmax (n=25)
10−6 19 1 26 1
10−5 19 1 326 2
10−4 172 2 326 2
10−3 988 3 2626 3
5 · 10−3 12616 5 68406 5
B. Computation of Protection Levels
For every hypothesis j, the jth predicted VPL can be
computed from the vertical standard deviation of the subset
solution, the vertical bias projection, and the predicted solution
separation [8]:
VPLj,pred = Kmd,j · σv,j +
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣[Sj ]3,i∣∣∣ · bmax +Dss,j (5)
The allocated partition of the integrity budget has been used
to define the inflation factor Kmd,j for the Gaussian overbound
of the vertical position accuracy σv,j corresponding to the
hypothesis j with N measurements.
The inflation Kmd,j is computed so that it represents the
two-sided tail probability of HMI conditioned on the hypoth-
esis j:
Kmd,j = Q
−1
(
1
2
P {HMI|Hj}
)
(6)
The predicted solution separation Dss,j is an estimate on the
vertical component of the difference between the all-in-view
solution and the subset solution excluding the hypothetically
faulted satellites. In this case the VPL would be predicted
without knowing the actual set of pseudorange measurements,
using the URE and bnom assumptions. Because the predicted
solution separation is computed in order to satisfy the con-
tinuity requirement, we do not need to employ the more
conservative URA and bmax values used for the integrity
calculations above.
∆Sj = Sj − S0 (7)
σss,j =
[
∆Sj · Σ ·∆STj
]
3,3
(8)
Dss,j = Kcont,jσss,j +
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣[Sj ]3,i∣∣∣ · bnom (9)
The VPL for the position solution including all computed
fault hypotheses is then determined as the maximum of all
VPLj,pred:
VPLpred = max VPLj,pred . (10)
The allocation of integrity sub-budgets to the set of com-
puted hypotheses can be optimized such as that all VPLj
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become identical while the sum of the allocated probabilities
does not exceed the remaining budget [9]. Further, [5] shows
that while it is assured that the unoptimized predicted VPLpred
overbounds the real-time VPL at the pre-defined continuity
risk, integrity allocation optimization results in a compression
of the margin between the real-time and the predicted VPL.
Additional requirements defined by LPV-200 include the
EMT and the (Accc). The EMT requirement is specifically
assigned to the fault case, and it bounds the probability on
vertical errors larger than 15m in the fault case to mitigate
additional workload for pilots in final approach. The vertical
accuracy in the fault-free case is required to be below 4m
for 95% of the time. The system can be considered available
only if a position solution can satisfy all of the requirements
VPL, EMT and Accv . The EMT requirement is currently
under discussion, and the final interpretation is not yet fixed.
Within this work, the implementation of EMT follows the
interpretation of [8]. For higher probabilities of satellite faults,
the availability results of the simulations suggest that the EMT
requirement becomes a limiting factor to availability besides
VPL.
C. Specific implementation of the MHSS algorithm
The main characteristics which distinguish our implemen-
tation of the MHSS algorithm from other versions of MHSS
RAIM are:
• In contrast to analyses in [6], [8], the present implemen-
tation completely assesses the threat space with respect
to any number of concurrent satellite faults. It is assumed
that single satellite faults are uncorrelated, thus their prob-
ability can be combinatorially determined. In addition,
constellation faults are considered at a fixed, pre-defined
probability which can be adjusted per constellation.
• No chi-squared test is needed for identifying faults,
yielding a reduced probability of false detection of a fault
in this MHSS version. Instead, a recursive fault detection
and elimination (FDE) method helps to only eliminate
those faults where a range measurement error translates
into a hazardous positioning error.
• A specific fraction of the integrity budget is allocated to
unlikely fault scenarios, whose Protection Levels do not
need to be explicitly estimated. This significantly reduces
the computational complexity of the algorithm. The size
of this budget is a parameter of the algorithm, which
allows making an efficient tradeoff between the process-
ing time (or TTA) of the algorithm and availability. This
configuration feature provides a much needed function in
a scenario where the number of satellites in sight can be
in the 15-25 range, as opposed to the 6-12 range for GPS
alone.
• The VPL prediction algorithm makes another practical
tradeoff: it optimizes integrity budget allocations be-
tween the possible fault modes, while using fixed, equal
continuity allocations for the continuity budget. Past
investigations [9] have found that this tradeoff leads to
an insignificant deterioration of the VPL values, while
potentially reducing the runtime of the MHSS algorithm
significantly, in order to increase the timeliness of poten-
tial alert warnings to the aviation user.
• Finally, an original method is employed for evaluat-
ing both single satellite (uncorrelated) faults and entire
constellation (or correlated multiple satellite) faults as
hypotheses in the same framework. This allows more
flexibility for the algorithm to handle complex real-life
situations, while also optimizing the overall performance
of the integrity algorithm.
IV. SIMULATION OF PREDICTED ARAIM PERFOR-
MANCE
To assess how the performance of ARAIM depends on the
satellite fault probability and constellation fault probability,
a set of simulations has been run using a GPS and Galileo
combined constellation, and a GPS, Galileo and GLONASS
combined constellation. In the current simulations, the pre-
dicted VPL was computed along with the EMT and the vertical
accuracy. From the resulting sets of data, the user location
based availability with respect to the LPV-200 criteria has been
determined.
A. Simulation Setup
While the ARAIM algorithm was independently imple-
mented at the German Aerospace Center (DLR), it was in-
tegrated into the MAAST simulation platform [10] at a later
stage to provide more comparability with other work in this
field. As a baseline for the simulated space segments, a 27-
SV GPS constellation with optimized slot distribution was
simulated, and a nominal number of 27 satellites for Galileo,
and 24 satellites for GLONASS. While GPS has exceeded its
nominal state for years, the current total of 31 satellites [11]
are currently distributed in 24 unique slots, with an adjustment
of the constellation set-up being executed to use 27 different
slots [12]. The geometrical diversity of a set of satellites is a
more deciding factor to ARAIM performance than the number
of visible satellites, and the simulated constellation of 27
geometry-optimized satellites provides a single-constellation
geometry that closely resembles today’s performance of the
GPS segment with respect to the metrics evaluated. However
it should be emphasized that multiple satellites in close for-
mation still provide some redundancy of their measurements
which can mitigate the geometry degradation if one satellite
fails or is set into maintenance mode.
Galileo and GPS use inclination angles of 56◦ and 55◦
for their orbital planes. While Galileo uses only three orbital
planes to accommodate 27 SVs, GPS distributes them on 6
planes. The average geometry for users is equally well-suited
for navigation, though.
GLONASS provides 24 satellites only in its full nominal
state, and the orbital inclination is at 65◦. The difference
is that although there is a better coverage in high latitude
regions, the equatorial and mid-latitude regions experience
less densely distributed satellites, ultimately leading to a lower
average number of satellites for the users. The mere decrease
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in ranging sources creates a significant degradation of posi-
tioning accuracy irrespective of the assumptions on the signal
characteristics. It has been shown in [13] that the GLONASS
constellation fails to provide enough ranging sources to allow
LPV-200 compliant performance with ARAIM at any user
location. In the cited study, the signal characteristics origi-
nate from legacy GPS assumptions [14] to account for the
characteristic of a modernized signal transmitted by future
GLONASS-K satellites.
With different space segments from multiple operators being
simulated jointly, it is important to define how the relative ori-
entation of the individual space segments should be assumed.
The angular distance between individual orbital planes of a
single GNSS is kept constant by the operator. However the
Right Ascension of the Ascending Node (RAAN) parameter
that defines the relative orientation of an orbital plane with
respect to a fixed point in space changes slowly over time due
to precession. The rate of change is a parameter that varies
with the circumference of the satellite orbits, therefore the
orbital planes of GPS and Galileo turn slowly with respect
to each other. The same holds for any other combination of
different GNSS using different orbital heights.
In the present study, an approximation of the worst case rel-
ative constellation phasing has been approximated by aligning
the RAAN of the first orbital plane of every GNSS space
segment simulated. Since Galileo and GPS use almost the
same orbital inclinations, three of the GPS planes coincide
with the Galileo planes. The GPS and GLONASS planes
coincide only at the equator, since their orbital inclinations
differ by nine degrees.
The essential satellite signal characteristics depend on the
modulation scheme used in the SV payload, ground monitoring
accuracy and other factors individual to every GNSS. An in-
depth analysis of the ARAIM performance dependence on
URA and bias assumptions was provided in [5]. However to
show the connection between fault probabilities and VPLs, all
assumptions regarding the satellite signals have been assumed
identical in the framework of this study. For integrity purposes,
in the VPL URA values of 1.0 m for all three constellations,
and maximum bias magnitudes of 0.75 m are assumed. The
Accv and EMT measures have been computed using a URE
of 0.25 m and a nominal bias magnitude of 0.1 m.
The minimum elevation angle for all users has been set to
5◦ for GPS and GLONASS, according to the Interface Spec-
ification (IS) document [15]. For Galileo, the elevation mask
has been set to 10◦ to correspond with current discussions
on future Galileo IS. All simulations have been carried out
for users separated around the globe on a 5◦x5◦ degrees grid,
including high latitude regions up to 85◦. A total duration
of 10 days with 10-min. timesteps was simulated in order
to include a full revolution of the Galileo constellation. The
phasing effect between Galileo and GLONASS which has a
total inter-constellation revolution time of 40 days [13] has
not fully been covered in this study, since this combination of
GNSS only appears in the triple constellation scenarios.
To simulate not only the nominal performance expected
using full constellations, satellites have been excluded in an
additional set of simulations. Under one degraded performance
test scenario, every simulation was run with one fixed PRN
number excluded. This scenario attempts to reproduce the
conditions where scheduled maintenance of a single satellite
is being performed, as well as other cases where its navigation
data stream may be set unhealthy.
Under another simulation test scenario, for assessment of
the worst case with respect to geometry, the satellite exclusion
that resulted in the highest increase of VDOP was performed
for each time step and user location, yielding the worst case
degraded VPL. This was done both for the nominal “best case”
scenario as well as for the “maintenance” scenario, resulting
in a total of four levels of geometry degradation (’Nominal’,
’Fixed PRN out’, ’Critical PRN out’, ’Fixed+Critical PRN
out’).
All scenarios result in data sets of VPL, EMT and vertical
accuracy for every user and at every simulated time step.
Several approaches have been taken to assess the performance
of the different scenarios. First, the 99.5th and 99.9th percentile
of the user VPL for every location has been computed from
the results. This metric shows that even small, gradual changes
to the scenario can significantly influence the VPL. The
availability requirement for every individual user location was
defined at 99.9 percent in this work, taking into account
previous results which already showed good performance for
dual constellation scenarios. The coverage figure is formed by
weighting each location grid point according to its correspond-
ing geographical area and taking the weighted sum, which
represents the percentage of the global surface where the
availability requirement is met. A coverage of 50% therefore
means that 50% of the users can presumably use ARAIM
with a maximum VPL of 35m at 99.9% of the time. Coverage
can either be based on the VPL requirement (VPL ≤ VAL),
the EMT requirement (EMT ≤ 15m), or on a combination
off all requirements. The vertical accuracy requirement is not
explicitly discussed since in our simulations, this requirement
was always met.
The results from scenarios with different parametrization
w.r.t. Psat are presented in plots showing VPL percentiles
against the fault probability, or coverage against probability.
B. Dual and Triple Constellation Performance
Baseline a priori assumptions that have been used in pre-
vious work on ARAIM [6] are a per satellite probability of
fault Psat = 10−5 /approach and a per constellation probability
of fault Pconst = 10−7 /approach. Figure 1 shows a plot of
the 99.9th VPL percentile at 2520 simulated user locations
during 10 days of simulated time. This percentile represents
the more stringent option for the availability requirements
for LPV-200. The color coding shows only few areas where
the metric comes close to the threshold, VAL = 35m. For
most locations, the VPL is below 20m and there is enough
headroom to compensate even for losses of satellites without
losing availability. The VPL-based coverage is given in the
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subscript of the figure, and it is can be observed that this
scenario achieves a 100% coverage for LPV-200.
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Fig. 1. Dual GPS+Galileo constellation VPL at Psat = 10−5. The VPL
based coverage is at 100%, meaning that at all locations, LPV-200 compliant
precision approach is possible.
The next result presented shows the availability of ARAIM
with a worst-case probability of fault of Psat = 5·10−3. If only
little confidence might be obtained from recent observations
of a newly activated GNSS, and the integrity supporting
architecture makes it necessary to assume a large external
alert time for ground observed faults, this scenario could
probably still be seen as a worst case. However it is interesting
to see how ARAIM performs under extremely pessimistic
assumptions. The dual-constellation VPL-based availability is
shown in Figure 2 illustrating that ARAIM performance can
still meet the requirements.
In this scenario, the massive increase in fault probability
causes the algorithm to search for all combinations of as much
as up to five simultaneous satellite faults. In consequence, the
number of computed hypotheses is increasing depending on
the number of ranging measurements, and the likelihood to
obtain very weak geometries after excluding five satellites
becomes larger. Nevertheless, the dependence on the fault
probability is not excessively strong when VPL is analyzed
as the primary constraint, the VPL-based coverage remaining
close to 100% even under these worst-case assumptions.
The same Psat = 5 · 10−3 scenario results in an EMT
availability plot that is shown in Figure 3. Here, the results
seem more inhomogeneous and some gaps in availability exist
at various spots on the simulated earth surface. Availability
for particular locations drops below 99%, illustrated as blue
areas in the plot. Thus, the coverage area for the locations that
meet the EMT is now limited to only 82%. In conclusion, the
availability of the service is limited by EMT. It should be noted
in this context that the exact definition of the EMT requirement
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Fig. 2. Dual GPS+Galileo constellation availability based on VPL, at Psat =
5 ·10−3. The availability coverage is close to 100% even at this high satellite
fault probability, if only the VPL requirement is considered.
is still subject to interpretation. Additionaly, this result may be
of secondary significance, since the limiting property of EMT
becomes only visible if the probability of fault is excessively
high.
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Fig. 3. Dual GPS+Galileo constellation availability for EMT at Psat =
5·10−3/approach. Regions with low EMT availability result in the EMT-based
coverage becoming significantly smaller. The overall availability is limited by
the shown EMT availability, as depicted in Figure 8.
Next, the above worst-case scenario is directly compared to
the triple constellation case using the 99.9th VPL percentile.
Figure 4 illustrates that the headroom between the VPL and
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the VAL for the dual constellation case has already signifi-
cantly shrunken compared with the initially shown scenario
in Figure 1. At isolated locations the 99.9% VPL exceeds the
VAL, and the global VPL coverage has slightly deteriorated
from 100.00% to 99.99%. The same probability assumptions
used in a triple constellation scenario result in VPLs always
below 25m, and the few availability holes have successfully
been mitigated (Figure 5).
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Fig. 4. Dual GPS+Galileo constellation VPL at Psat = 5 · 10−3/approach.
Most locations fulfill the VPL requirement, and most locations have more
than 10m headroom before exceeding the VAL.
V. DEPENDENCE ON SV FAULT PROBABILITY
The following analysis results from direct comparison of
otherwise identical scenarios where the probability of satellite
fault, Psat, varied ranging from a minimum of 10−6/approach
to a maximum of 5·10−3/approach. Previous work on ARAIM
has assumed a per approach fault probability of 10−5/satellite,
this value stemming from past data that has been collected
from observations on the operating GPS constellation [8]. The
fault probability is determined by converting an average annual
fault rate of the GNSS into the hypothetic probability of a
single satellite fault within one approach of 150s duration.
While this approach is valid if an underlying continuous
transmission of the ISM data is assumed, extension of the
time intervals that elapse between ISM transmissions lead to
a higher effective probability of satellite fault that has to be
used for navigation integrity. Instead of the approach duration,
the significantly longer time interval of external updates is
then used as a basis for converting the annual fault rate into a
corresponding SV fault probability, ultimately increasing the
latter.
A second rationale for analysis of high fault probabilities
follows from the inclusion of GNSS space segments that
will only be fully operating in a few years from now. Until
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Fig. 5. Triple GPS+Galileo+GLONASS constellation VPL at Psat = 5 ·
10−3/approach. All locations are within the requirement, and the average
VPL performance is significantly increased.
enough data is collected on actual fault performance of the
operating system, only assumptions and deductions from other
existing GNSS (i.e. GPS) can be used to assess the relia-
bility of the signals and its monitoring. High confidence in
this assessment necessarily depends on long-term observation
data, thus additional time will have to pass until Galileo or
modernized GLONASS can trustingly be used for ARAIM
if a low probability of satellite fault needs to be assumed.
The following analysis shows the deterioration in performance
if the systems are assumed only to guarantee a higher fault
probability.
A. Availability Limitations due to VPL/EMT
Figures 6 and 7 show the global availability coverage of a
dual-constellation scenario for different Psat. The underlying
constellation fault probability has been assumed at Pconst =
10−7/approach here. In Figure 6, the global coverage was
computed based on the availability criterion for meeting the
VPL requirement only. The plot shows the percentage of area
in the simulated region (±85◦ latitude) where the VPL is
below VAL = 35m at 99.9 percent of the time or more. The
four sets of data depict the nominal dual-constellation scenario,
the critical-out scenario with the satellite most vital to vertical
positioning accuracy being excluded, the fixed-out scenario
where one pre-defined PRN was excluded to reproduce the
effect of a SV maintenance, and a combined outage scenario
where a fixed SV (not necessarily in view for all users), and
in addition the critical SV (always in view) were excluded.
Note that the availability coverage of worst-case scenarios
such as the critical-out and the combined outage case is clearly
not a requirement for proving the performance of the analyzed
scenario. It is helpful though to assess the degradation of
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Fig. 6. GPS+Galileo constellation availability coverages, based only on
the VPL requirement. For nominal and “maintenance” scenarios, all assumed
satellite fault probabilities up to 2.5 ·10−3/approach result in 100% coverage.
performance in a worst case in order to estimate the maximum
susceptibility of the system to unexpected geometry loss.
The VPL-based availability of combined GPS-Galileo
ARAIM achieves full coverage for almost any of the simulated
fault priors. Only when the simulated satellite fault probability
is above 5 · 10−4/approach, some user locations do not fully
meet the availability requirement. This is not only true for
the nominal combination of the constellations, but also if
one of the satellites is unavailable due to maintenance. In
the scenarios where every set of measurements has been
degraded by the VDOP-critical satellite, availability coverage
is observed to drop significantly.
Figure 7 shows the same scenario with the combined
availability requirement being assessed instead of the VPL-
based availability. This means only the area where all of the
VPL, EMT and vertical accuracy requirements have been met
at the same time at least in 99.9% of the time steps count
for this availability figure. The resulting overall performance
has a more significant drop at high priors. More interestingly,
the worldwide coverage is slightly degraded for the nominal
constellations already at the Psat = 5·10−4/approach prior, and
in the maintenance situation the coverage is only slightly above
95% for most simulated priors. In contrast to the case shown
in Figure 6, this result again suggests that EMT, interpreted
in the current manner, is a more limiting factor to ARAIM
usability than VPL, and this requirement needs to be more
accurately investigated on.
B. Constellation Prior Effect on Availability
The following figures illustrate the effect of different con-
stellation fault assumptions on the performance of ARAIM.
First depicted is the dual constellation scenario in Figure 8,
with the most critical satellite removed in every geometry,
and using a high constellation prior assumption of Pconst =
10−7/approach.
All individual availability requirements are shown here,
along with the combined requirement which coincides closely
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Fig. 7. GPS+Galileo constellation availability coverages, now based on
VPL+EMT+Accv requirement. The nominal scenario provides only 100%
coverage for Psat ≤ 10−3/approach. A single satellite exclusion leads to
constant degradation of the EMT performance for all SV fault probabilities.
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Fig. 8. Critical GPS+Galileo constellation, availability coverages, at a high
constellation fault probability of Pconst = 10−7/approach. The individual
requirements show different susceptibility to satellite fault probability.
with the EMT requirement. Note that technically, the com-
bined coverage is bounded by the individual requirements
and thus can be smaller than the minimum of {VPL, EMT,
Accv}; however the EMT requirement is dominant here. Apart
from the more significant EMT results, small deficiencies
already exist also in the VPL coverage at low priors. Since the
worst-case situation that has been remodeled here is strictly
speaking not applicable for availability analysis, these holes in
coverage are not necessarily a threat to meeting the integrity
requirement. However, they may represent situations of non-
availability due to loss of signal during approach, where the
resulting drop in performance would make missed approach
procedure necessary. The implications are therefore significant
in what concerns continuity, and will become important once
ARAIM is used as primary means of navigation in critical
situations, where unscheduled aircraft maneuvers create addi-
tional workload and thus more operational risk at the air traffic
control (ATC) level.
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The second figure for this comparison, Figure 9, shows
how a lower assumption on the constellation fault probability
results in more robust performance especially for the EMT.
The effect previously introduced in Figure 7, which revealed
a significant deficiency in meeting the EMT requirement even
for only one satellite in maintenance is mitigated by a smaller
constellation fault prior.
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Fig. 9. Critical GPS+Galileo constellation, availability coverages, at a lower
constellation fault probability of only Pconst = 10−8/approach. For low
satellite fault probabilities, the relaxed constellation fault assumption leads to
full performance even for the EMT requirement in this worst case scenario.
Next, the impact of engaging a third constellation into the
navigation solution is discussed. Following from the results
above, the gain in availability may be small, since dual con-
stellation GPS+Galileo can already achieve good performance.
Figures 10 and 11 show the VPL percentiles of different
degradation scenarios for dual- and triple constellation simula-
tions. While the baseline VPL for the less degraded ’Nominal’
and ’Fixed PRN out’ scenarios only changes insignificantly
when additional 24 satellites are introduced, a performance
gain can be seen for the worst cases. Therefore, only minor
benefit results from using three constellations, while the trade-
off between a marginal gain for worst case scenarios and
additional computational complexity has to be considered.
Combined (VPL, EMT, Accuracy) availability is presented
in Figure 12. Unsurprisingly, the EMT limitation has also
disappeared when three constellations are used at the same
time. A scaled detail of the availability is depicted here,
showing that only the worst-case degraded scenarios miss
full coverage at higher magnitudes of Psat. Because of the
computational complexity, the triple constellation scenarios
with relatively high P sat have only been simulated for the
nominal case, and no data points are available for degraded
scenarios. However it can be seen that triple constellation
ARAIM provides very robust performance, even under the
more pessimistic assumptions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The present work provides a parametric study on the
ARAIM algorithm examining the LPV-200 relevant perfor-
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Fig. 10. GPS+Galileo constellation VPL results. For high SV fault proba-
bilities, worst case scenarios have high 99.9th percentiles of the VPL.
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Fig. 11. GPS+Galileo+GLONASS triple constellation VPL results. All
geometries are now apparently more robust against loss of signal scenarios.
10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3
95
95.5
96
96.5
97
97.5
98
98.5
99
99.5
100
99.9% Worldwide VPL+EMT+Acc
v
 Coverage (+/−85° latitude)
27 GPS, 27 Galileo, 24 GLONASS,  P
const= 1e−007
SV failure prior
W
or
ld
w
id
e 
co
ve
ra
ge
 [%
]
 
 
nominal
fixed out
critical out
both out
Fig. 12. Zoomed-in view of triple constellation availability coverages.
Only at high satellite fault probabilities, the artificial worst-case scenario
show any deficiency in availability coverage. This figure depicts a zoomed-in
view of the plot to illustrate the small magnitude of degradation. For higher
probabilities than 5 · 10−4/approach, this simulation has not been run for
degraded geometries, thus no data is available except for the nominal case.
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mance criteria when combinations of two or three GNSS are
used. Since, at present, estimates on the probability of satellite
fault on newly operating constellations are difficult to justify,
this analysis made the approach of determining the availability
of different sets of probability assumptions for ARAIM users.
Dual-constellation combinations of 27 GPS and 27 Galileo
satellites, as well as a triple constellation combination based
on 27 GPS, 27 Galileo and 24 GLONASS-K satellites have
been simulated worldwide using a range of prior satellite
fault probabilities between 10−6 and 5 · 10−3 per approach.
Constellation fault probabilities have been simulated at 10−8
and 10−7 per approach.
As a result, the Galileo-GPS combination can provide
worldwide performance suitable for LPV-200 compliant ap-
proaches. Unless the actual fault probability measured for
satellites of future modernized constellations will be unusually
high (i.e. of over 200 faults/year in each constellation with a
6-hr fault latency), the VPL requirement is met even when
one satellite is taken offline for maintenance. Surprisingly,
the newly discussed EMT requirement poses a more stringent
limitation on availability for all scenarios. However, the spe-
cific EMT requirements published in the ICAO Annex 10 [16]
are still currently subject to interpretation. The authors of this
study recommend that the wording of the EMT requirement be
further clarified, with hindsight to the significant impact these
requirements can have on satellite navigation availability for
civil aviation.
If a triple constellation GNSS is employed, simulation
results show some headroom towards the requirements that
have to be met. Even under worst case situations, LPV-200
precision approaches are possible given the current interpreta-
tion of the ICAO requirements, including EMT [8]. Singular
worst case geometries that might affect continuity with a dual
constellation approach no longer occur, and the dependence of
average availability and availability coverage on the constel-
lation and satellite fault priors is further reduced. However, a
triple constellation under the paradigm of multiple independent
satellite faults leads to high numbers of hypotheses if the fault
probabilities are high, and this could pose a limitation on real-
time applications due to potentially increased processing times.
In conclusion, the current research results recommend two
possible options for achieving the LPV-200 required naviga-
tion performance with multiple-constellation GNSS:
1) Setting stricter performance limits for a system compris-
ing of at most two constellations, such that this system
will provide the necessary performance in conjunction
with ARAIM for certification as a primary navigation
means in civil aviation applications.
2) Adapting MHSS ARAIM for use with more than two
constellations at a time by limiting the total number of
satellites used for processing integrity limits, possibly
by employing a selection process applicable to visible
satellites from all available constellations.
Under both options, in order to provide the necessary integrity,
an ARAIM algorithm would require a ground monitoring
network to provide an ISM to GNSS users, which would
allow them to periodically update their assumptions around
the necessary fault probabilities and GNSS measurement error
model. This monitoring system is foreseen to be compatible
with existing SBAS infrastructure, while being less technically
demanding and less cost-expensive to develop in regions
without SBAS coverage at present.
The Navigation Integrity team at DLR is currently in the
process of investigating both of the above-mentioned options
in order to come up with further recommendations regarding
the feasibility of implementing each option. These recom-
mendations would then be provided in combination with a
corresponding proposal for an ISM architecture.
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